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New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under
the California Constitution
By MARGARET C. CROSBY*
California residents have greater freedom than other Americans be-
cause the California Constitution has strong protection for individual
rights and because the California courts have taken seriously the in-
dependent force of the state constitution. Californians should celebrate
this liberty, which will become even more significant in the 1990s as the
United States Supreme Court increasingly restricts individual rights. To
maintain consistency in State constitutional doctrine, California courts
will be called upon to reaffirm precedents that afford their residents more
protection than the national norm. Moreover, California courts will be
called upon to apply California constitutional provisions to novel and
complex social phenomena that affect personal liberty. California courts
have acted in a principled fashion in developing a body of State law that
protects individual rights and is broader than federal law. State prece-
dents reflect the unique language and history of California constitutional
provisions and are responsive to the needs of this State and its people.
Three areas of constitutional law illustrate these principles: freedom of
expression, religious liberty, and privacy.
I. Freedom of Expression
A. Sources
The United States Constitution's First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of expression is drafted in tight, restrictive terms: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
... ."I In contrast, the parallel provision of the California Constitution
includes an affirmative right of expression: "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge
liberty of speech or press." 2 This affirmative provision neither mirrors
* Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1973.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2(a).
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nor derives from the First Amendment. It is clearly broader than the
Federal Free Speech Clause.3
B. Forums for Expression
1. Private Property: Shopping Centers
Any discussion of state constitutional protection for expression must
start with Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center4 because Pruneyard is so
seminal an opinion in state constitutional construction. Before
Pruneyard, from 1968 through 1976, the United States Supreme Court
issued a series of conflicting opinions on whether citizens had the right to
engage in expressive activity in privately owned shopping centers. In
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc. 5 the Court ruled that the First Amendment barred the use of state
trespass laws against members of the public expressing their views in
shopping centers. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,6 however, the Court re-
stricted Logan Valley sharply, stressing the private status of the property.
In Hudgens v. NLRB 7 the Court squarely overruled Logan Valley.
The plaintiffs in Pruneyard, students barred from petitioning in a
San Jose, California, shopping mall, challenged their exclusion from the
mall in court. They argued that because San Jose had no downtown
business district, a situation largely due to the growth of shopping cen-
ters, they were entitled to petition in a shopping center because they
lacked adequate alternative channels of communication, which were as-
sumed to exist in Lloyd.' The California Supreme Court took a broader
approach, ruling that article I, sections 2 and 3 of the California Consti-
tution (guaranteeing liberty of speech and petition) required all shopping
center owners to allow members of the public who wished to speak or
petition the opportunity to do so.'
This state constitutional holding required the Court to confront the
potential federal constitutional question: Did private property owners
have federally guaranteed rights that would supersede the speakers' state
constitutional rights to expression? In other words, was the language in
Lloyd stressing private property directed at defining the limits of federal
free speech by holding that the absence of state action made the First
3. See Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 393-95, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 880-82
(1984).
4. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
5. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
6. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
7. 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
8. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 907, 592 P. 2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
9. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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Amendment inapplicable, or did it establish fifth amendment property
rights in the mall owners? The Court decided that Lloyd was primarily a
first amendment case, allowing broader construction of the state consti-
tution to limit the interest of shopping center owners in excluding mem-
bers of the public.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, civil liber-
ties advocates relied on a number of cases in which the Supreme Court
had rejected civil liberties claims under a federal doctrine that property
rights originate from such sources as state law, not the Federal Constitu-
tion.'° These opinions became the basis for the argument protecting the
California Supreme Court decision in Pruneyard: the State's highest
court had defined property rights in compliance with the State's highest
law. The Court agreed that the Federal Constitution was implicated
only by confiscatory conduct or contravention of "any other constitu-
tional provision."'" In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the California Supreme
Court's Pruneyard decision. 2
Pruneyard illustrates two significant aspects of state constitutional
adjudication. First, it indicates that although overriding federal rights
limit state courts' authority to confer independent state constitutional
rights, state courts should take a hard look at federal precedents to see
whether they articulate federally conferred rights that act as barriers to
independent state constitutional adjudication.1 3
Second, Pruneyard demonstrates the ability of state constitutions to
respond to local conditions. California is a state in which the shopping
center has assumed enormous commercial significance, eclipsing the
traditional "Main Street" as the area in which people congregate. If free-
dom of expression were to survive in California's modern commercial
era, then State constitutional provisions protecting speech had to open
privately owned malls as a forum for expression.
Pruneyard is a significant decision, both because it has sparked simi-
lar opinions in other states14 and because it has revitalized grass-roots
10. See, eg., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no fourteenth amendment
hearing requirement prior to nonrenewal of a non-tenured state teachers' contract).
11. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81.
12. Id. at 75-76.
13. Before Pruneyard, many courts assumed that Lloyd was a fifth amendment decision
that precluded more expansive state constitutional interpretation. See Diamond v. Bland II,
11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974), rev'g Diamond v. Bland I, 3 Cal. 3d
653, 477 P.2d. 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635
P.2d. 108 (1981); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d. 590 (1983)
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activism in California. The shopping center industry has launched a
massive resistance to the decision, promulgating burdensome and restric-
tive rules for petitioning activity. That, in turn, has led to a second wave
of shopping center litigation challenging the validity of the regulations.15
The struggle over access to shopping centers will continue to occupy
state courts in the years ahead.
2. Public Forums
In an analogous area, California constitutional law defines public
forums for expression much more expansively than the federal doctrine.
In this State, public property must be available for expressive purposes
that are not inconsistent with the use to which the government has dedi-
cated the property.I6 Thus, for example, if the traffic function of a prison
parking lot is not impeded by the communicative activities of prisoners'
families, the prison must permit this activity.17
California's public forum doctrine parallels federal constitutional
law before 1980. In recent years, however, the United States Supreme
Court has accorded the government the regulatory authority, compara-
ble to the right of a private property owner, to dedicate property to
nonexpressive uses. 8 Only traditional public forums (streets and parks)
must remain open for all protected activity. 19 The government may cre-
ate "limited public forums" such as university facilities for recognized
student clubs, 20 but it may also reasonably limit access to those forums
or close them altogether. In all areas the government has not dedicated
to speech-"nonpublic forums"-the government may even engage in
content-based discrimination. It may allow some speakers but not
others, provided that it does not suppress a particular view on which
speech is allowed ("viewpoint discrimination"). 2
(both protecting unobtrusive signature solicitation at shopping malls under their respective
state constitutions).
15. See H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 238
Cal. Rptr. 841 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1248 (1988).
16. University of California Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1984).
17. Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 185 Cal. Rptr.
634 (1982).
18. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Eduactors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
19. Id. at 45.
20. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788 (1985) (respondents exclusion from charity drive is viewpoint-neutral and therefore consti-
tutionally permissible).
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California's more expansive definition of public forums illustrates an
important aspect of state constitutional law: its role in promoting consis-
tency in constitutional doctrine. Even though state precedents may de-
rive from federal precedents, state constitutional law should not expand
and contract automatically with shifts in opinions from the United States
Supreme Court. The essence of an independent body of state law is that
it is not controlled by the judiciary in Washington, D.C., 3000 miles
away. In coming years, California's public forum law will be a focal
point of concern for lawyers supportive of independent state constitu-
tional interpretation. California courts should not follow the United
States Supreme Court in narrowing access to public property for expres-
sive purposes, but should adhere to consistent state constitutional
doctrine.
C. Subsidized Speech
Another area of current concern regarding freedom of expression
involves restrictions placed by the government on speech subsidized with
public funds. The United States Supreme Court increasingly has adopted
a deferential attitude toward evaluating governmental conditions on pub-
lic benefits.22 If the Court characterizes such restrictions as a "penalty"
for protected conduct, the Court will employ strict scrutiny, imposing a
heavy burden of justification from the government.2 3 But if the Court
views the challenged restriction as simply a "failure to fund," it allows
the state far more latitude.24 In recent years, such restrictions have in-
creasingly been characterized as "failures to fund." For example, the
Court upheld federal legislation that denied a worker and his family food
stamps though the worker's financial status satisfied neutral eligibility
criteria-lack of sufficient income-because his financial problems re-
sulted from participation in a labor dispute and subsequent strike.25 It is
22. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Supreme Court added a new gloss to the
federal doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. It required, for close judicial scrutiny, either
that the government erect a new hurdle to the exercise of constitutional rights or that a benefit
recipient lose other, related benefits upon the exercise of constitutional rights. If these ele-
ments are not present, the Court will evaluate the constitutionality of benefit restrictions under
the substantial interest test.
23. Id. at 474 n.8; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The Court distin-
guished earlier federal precedents on unconstitutional conditions as "penalty" cases. These
include Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974). Id. at 317 n.9.
24. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18.
25. Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (challenging the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1988)).
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not intuitively obvious that this was a failure to fund rather than a pen-
alty for expression.
During the 1988 Term the Court declined to determine the constitu-
tionality of a Missouri law forbidding family planning counselors from
advising their clients of the option of abortion when the counseling is
subsidized with public funds.26 The Court declined to decide this issue
holding that it was moot. Because similar restrictions exist in federal
regulations,27 the Court is expected to resolve the important question of
subsidized speech in the future.
California courts have developed an extensive body of law on the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which holds that if a condition of
receiving a public benefit is the waiver of a fundamental right, the gov-
ernment must justify the restriction by a stringent three-part test that is
functionally identical to strict scrutiny.28 This is true even where the
challenged restriction could be characterized as a "failure to fund"
speech rather than a penalty on speech. For example, in Danskin v. San
Diego Unified School District,29 the California Supreme Court held that
refusal to allow "subversive" speech in public auditoriums was unconsti-
tutional despite the government's claim that it simply did not wish to
support "subversive" views with public funds. The doctrine has been
invoked in many free speech cases dealing with the right of public em-
ployees to engage in political expression,30 to refuse to sign loyalty
oaths,31 and to gain access to public housing despite being considered
"subversive elements."'32 Under the California Constitution, restrictions
26. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3053 (1989).
27. These are currently being litigated in federal courts. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of America v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1988) (preliminary injunction), ap-
peal filed, No. 88-2251 (10th Cir.); Massachusets v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988),
aff'd, No. 88-1279 (1st Cir. May 8, 1989), vacated and withdrawn, reh'g en banc granted, No.
88-1279 (1st Cir. Aug 9, 1989); New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
28. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1966).
[A] governmental agency which would require a waiver of constitutional rights as a
condition of public employment must demonstrate: (1) that the political restraints
rationally relate to the enhancement of the public service, (2) that the benefits which
the public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional
rights, and (3) that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights are
available.
Id. at 501-02, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
29. 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
30. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d 499,421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401; Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm., 61
Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
31. Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409
(1967).
32. Housing Auth. v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956).
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on publicly funded speech are subjected to close judicial scrutiny.33 The
government is not totally forbidden from imposing conditions on the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights in benefit programs, but it bears a heavy
burden of justifying such restrictions.34
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is important in the modem
welfare state where the government has massive control over public re-
sources. To allow the state to use that authority to manipulate the ways
in which citizens exercise fundamental rights is to allow a significant in-
cursion into freedom. While the United States Supreme Court has been
increasingly willing to give the federal government great latitude in "buy-
ing up" fundamental rights by strategic restrictions on public benefits,
the California Constitution will serve as a bulwark against similar restric-
tions unless they serve a compelling public need.
D. Summary of Freedom of Expression
The California Constitution's free speech doctrine offers more pro-
tection than its federal counterpart for less affluent speakers who most
need access to shopping centers, public property, and public benefits. In
an era in which public opinion is often shaped by techniques such as
television advertising, marketing focus groups, and mass computer mail-
ings-communications technology that is priced far beyond the reach of
many Americans-it is important that people have alternative means of
expressing their views on important topics. Often, the people who most
need access to low-cost forums for speech are those with views that dis-
sent from the opinions held by those who can afford modern mass com-
munications-the political majority, corporate executives, and the
government. Constitutional principles that preserve forums where peo-
ple congregate and limit the government's power to manipulate subsi-
dized expression are important because they maintain a society in which
different voices can be heard. In the coming years, protection for these
voices will come from the state, not the federal, constitution.
33. The California test for determining the constitutionality of a condition attached to
receipt of public benefits evaluates whether the condition relates to the purpose of the legisla-
tion that confers the benefit; whether the utility of imposing the condition manifestly out-
weighs any resulting impairment of constitutional rights; and whether the state has established
the unavailability of less offensive alternatives and demonstrated that the conditions are drawn
with narrow specificity. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 505-07, 421 P.2d at 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406-
07.
34. "[W]e acknowledge that government may, when circumstances inexorably so require,
impose conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly conferred benefits despite a resulting qualifi-
cation of constitiutional rights. In doing so, however, government bears a heavy burden of
demonstrating the practical necessity for the limitation." Id. at 505, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 406 (footnote omitted).
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II. Freedom of Religion
A. Sources
The California Constitution, like many state constitutions, contains
provisions protecting religious liberty and guaranteeing separation of
church and state in language far more detailed and comprehensive than
the Federal Constitution's First Amendment.
Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution prohibits the State
from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion" and guar-
antees that religion may be practiced "without discrimination or
preference.",35
California voters added the establishment clause by initiative in
1974.36 Although its language mirrors the Federal First Amendment,37
and State courts consult standards developed under the federal prece-
dents in construing it,38 its scope is broader than the Federal Establish-
ment Clause. Article I, section 4 is a document of independent vitality,
consistent with its passage in the same election (1974) in which the voters
enacted article I, section 24, declaring that "[r]ights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution." 39
California's free exercise clause, stating, "Free exercise and enjoy-
ment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed,"'
is clearly more expansive than its federal counterpart, for it not only pro-
hibits governmental interference with the exercise of religion, but also
governmental display of preference to any faith. This clause was part of
the original 1849 Constitution, although it was strengthened in 1879 by
changing the original language providing that free exercise is "allowed"
to "guaranteed."' 4 1  This section is "broader than the federal guarantee
because preference is forbidden, even when there is no discrimination."'42
35. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. "
38. Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal.App.3d 596, 616, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 253 (1976); Feminist
Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918,
922-23 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
40. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
41. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, CAL. CONST. CONVENTION 1878-1879, at 1171, cited
in Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 799-800 n.2, 587 P.2d 663, 667 n.2, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 867, 871 n.2 (1978) (Bird, C.J. concurring).
42. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 926 (1984) (citing Fox v. City
of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 796, 587 P.2d 663, 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1978)), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
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The California Constitution thus requires strict government neutrality
among faiths.43
Article IX, section 8 of the California Constitution prohibits public
school officials from permitting the instruction of "any sectarian or de-
nominational doctrine [to] be taught... directly or indirectly, in any of
the common schools of this State [or in the public school system]."'  In
addition, article IX, section 8 forbids public subsidy to any nonpublic.
school.45 This clause, added to the California Constitution in 1879,
firmly committed this State's school system to religious neutrality de-
cades before the United States Supreme Court declared prayer in schools
unconstitutional.4
6
Article XVI, section 5 prohibits all government entities from
"grant[ing] anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose."'  This provision, added to the State constitution in
1879, "does not mirror or derive from any part of the federal Constitu-
tion."'4 The California Supreme Court stated, "The section thus forbids
more than appropriation or payment of public funds to support sectarian
institutions."49 Also prohibited is aid "in the form of prestige and intan-
gible power."5" Because of its expansive language, this clause most
clearly reflects California's commitment to the principle of separation of
church and state. As Attorney General, Justice Stanley Mosk described
a constitutional prohibition on the use of public funds for any religious or
sectarian purposes as "the definitive statement of the principle of govern-
ment impartiality in the field of religion."5
These detailed and comprehensive provisions will serve as a bulwark
as the United States Supreme Court dilutes protection afforded by the
Federal First Amendment, a process that has already commenced. In
the coming years, the California Constitution will be the primary source
of protection for religious freedom in many areas, thus returning the
State constitution to the role that it was designed to play. This trend will
43. See 25 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 309, 313 (1955).
44. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
45. See California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr.
300 (1981).
46. See People ex rel. Beckwith v. Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 331 (1880); J. SWETT, PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA (1969).
47. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
48. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 801, 587 P.2d 663, 668, 150 Cal. Rptr.
867, 872 (1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
49. California Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 605 n.12, 526 P.2d 513, 521
n.12, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 369 n.12 (1974).
50. Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 802, 587 P.2d at 669, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
51. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 105, 107 (1961).
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be most striking in two areas: public subsidies to religion and symbolic
alliance between church and state.
B. Public Subsidies to Religion
The clear mandates of article IX, section 8 and article XVI, section
5 caused the California Supreme Court to depart from federal precedent
in striking down a loan program of public school textbooks to parents of
children attending parochial schools." The California Supreme Court
rejected both the reasoning and result of a United States Supreme Court
precedent, upholding a functionally identical program to that struck
down in California Teachers Association v. Riles under the Federal Estab-
lishment Clause. 3 Riles illustrates the significance of a textual difference
in state constitutional adjudication, which, in California, has mandated a
different, and more stringent, judicial role in evaluating public grants to
religious institutions. The United States Supreme Court distinguished
establishment clause precedents invalidating aid to parochial schools
from the textbook loan program by adopting wholesale the argument
that the arrangement benefitted the children rather than the parochial
schools. 4 The California Supreme Court, in contrast, not only rejected
the "child benefit" theory as proving too much (since any aid to paro-
chial schools ultimately inures to the benefit of the pupils), but also took
a much harder look at the reality of the program, piercing the fiction that
the parents requested the books and concluding that the entire program
was administered by and for the benefit of the religious schools. 5
The strong State constitutional limitation on public support of reli-
gion undoubtedly will become extremely important in coming years as
the United States Supreme Court allows greater public financial aid to
religion. The California Supreme Court's hard look at the reality of the
program struck down in Riles contrasts sharply with the extremely defer-
ential, if not myopic, approach recently taken by the United States
Supreme Court in Bowen v. Kendrick,56 upholding federal grants to reli-
gious organizations to combat teen pregnancy. The plaintiffs in Kendrick
challenged provisions of the Adolescent Family Life Act (popularly
known as the "Chastity Act") under which grants were made to non-
profit organizations, including religiously affiliated groups, to prevent
52. California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300
(1981).
53. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
54. Id.
55. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d at 810, 632 P.2d at 962, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
56. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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teenage pregnancy; 57 the Act specifically required that grantees en-
courage abstinence and not encourage abortion.58 The subjects of coun-
seling-sexuality, .pregnancy, contraception, and abortion-are
obviously sensitive, for many religions have developed extensive doctrine
on these topics. Indeed, a focal point of disagreement among religions is
their beliefs regarding sexuality and childbirth, and attempts to inculcate
those views and see them embodied in the secular law. The evidence in
Kendrick established, and the district court found, that religious grantees
had misused grants to counsel religious doctrine.59 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the program.' In contrast to the Riles court's
hard look at the reality of whether the public program financially benefit-
ted the religious mission of parochial institutions, the United States
Supreme Court dismissed the evidence that sectarian doctrine had been
promoted with public funds as showing incidental abuse, rather than a
systemic violation of the Establishment Clause's proscription on public
aid to religion.61
Kendrick represents a shift in establishment clause doctrine and her-
alds the future for challenges to aid to sectarian institutions. The Court
has adopted a casual attitude toward direct subsidies to religious organi-
zations and made it far more difficult to prove a systemic constitutional
violation sufficient to justify an injunction against public aid to religion.
In contrast, the California Constitution plainly and unequivocally bars
tax support for religious institutions. This will mandate much closer ju-
dicial scrutiny of social programs (such as aid to the homeless), in which
the government seeks the aid of religious organizations, to ensure that
the religious mission of the organization is not being subsidized.
C. Symbolic Alliance Between Church and State
Challenges to a symbolic alliance between church and state arise
most often in the context of religious symbols placed on public land. The
United States Supreme Court started a process of relaxing federal doc-
trine in this area in Lynch v. Donnelly.62 Lynch upheld the inclusion of a
Nativity scene in a municipal seasonal display that also included secular
Christmas symbols such as reindeer and Christmas trees.63 The Court
upheld the placement of the cr~ehe on the theory that it was secularized
57. Id. at 2566-68.
58. Id. at 2566-67.
59. Id. at 2573.
60. Id. at 2581.
61. Id. at 2573.
62. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
63. Id. at 687.
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by its surrounding context." This led to a wave of fact-intensive federal
litigation on religious displays, in which some federal courts counted the
number of plastic animals in the surrounding display, leading to the
"Two Plastic Reindeer" rule and the "St. Nicholas, Too" test.65
The Court revisited the issue in County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union,6 6 ruling on a Nativity scene and menorah display
in government buildings. The government in Allegheny argued that
surely Lynch was not a mandate for federal judges to count reindeer and
that the "context" that secularized the display must mean the Christmas
season.67 The Court ostensibly reaffirmed the Lynch standard, however,
looking to the surrounding display to ascertain whether an observer
would consider the inclusion of a religious symbol within the particular
physical setting as communicating governmental endorsement of reli-
gious beliefs.6" The Court majority adopted the approach suggested by
the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in Lynch, which focused on
whether the challenged object "'sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community.' "69
The stronger State constitutional protection against symbolic alli-
ance between church and state is illustrated by Fox v. City of Los Ange-
les,7" which barred the illumination of windows on the Los Angeles City
Hall in the form of a cross at Easter and Christmas. The display violated
the article I, section 4 prohibition against governmental "preference" of a
religious doctrine and the article XVI, section 5 prohibition against state
"aid" to religion, interpreted as barring the government from lending its
prestige or endorsement, as well as financial assistance, to religion.71
Nothing in Fox suggests that the addition of secular seasonal objects
would have rendered the cross illumination permissible.7 The focus of
the state constitutional tests is on the governmental action in "prefer-
64. Id. at 680-81.
65. American Civil Liberties Union v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655, 668-69 (3d
Cir. 1988) (Weis, J., dissenting), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
66. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
67. Brief for Petitioner at 14-19, Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989); see also Allegheny, 109
S. Ct. at 3101-05.
68. 109 S. Ct. at 3103-05.
69. Id. at 3118 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
70. 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
71. Id. at 800-03, 587 P.2d at 667-69, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 871-73 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
72. In a true public forum, the government's neutral, equal approval of the placement of
all other religious and secular symbols might satisfy the preference criterion of article 1, § 4.
See id. at 796-97, 587 P.2d at 665-66, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70.
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ring" and "aiding" religion by displaying its symbols publicly. An elabo-
rate contextual analysis is unnecessary. The constitutional test is
simpler: if the object is religious, the government should not use its re-
sources to display it.73 The explicit language of the California Constitu-
tion's clauses on religion mandate a different result from the Federal
Establishment Clause.
Even when the federal and state texts are identical-as with the Es-
tablishment Clauses of the First Amendment and article I, section 4-the
California Constitution is more protective. One of the analytic elements
of the Federal Establishment Clause is whether a challenged state-church
program fosters "'excessive government entanglement with religion,' ,
or divisiveness along religious lines.75 In Lynch and Kendrick the United
States Supreme Court limited this aspect of the establishment clause doc-
trine to direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions.76 Thus, in cases
dealing with placement of religious symbols or government support for
anti-abortion religious doctrine, the Court dismissed any resulting con-
troversy as legally irrelevant. In California, in contrast, political divisive-
ness is an element to be considered in evaluating whether the line
between church and state has become too close. Thus, a district attor-
ney's symbolic support for anti-abortion views by turning fetal tissue
over to a religious group for a burial ceremony was found to violate the
California Constitution, in part because of the divisiveness along reli-
gious lines of the abortion controversy.77
The California courts' insistence on considering whether State ac-
tion fosters religious divisiveness illustrates an important function of a
state constitution, namely, its responsiveness to local conditions. As Cal-
ifornia courts have recognized, this State has perhaps the most diverse
and pluralistic population of any state in the country, with a great
73. A court of appeal upheld the placement of a particular menorah, the Katowitz Meno-
rah, with singular historical significance, in Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App. 3d
566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1989). Central to the court's conclusion was its finding that the
Katowitz Menorah, "with its unique historical background, was much more a museum piece
than a symbol of religious worship." Id. at 580, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 922. To the extent that the
court ruled that religious symbols are permissible in government buildings, the decision would
appear to be incorrect under California law.
74. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
75. Id. at 622.
76. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562,
2577-78 (1988).
77. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 1091,
203 Cal. Rptr. 918, 926 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
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number of religious minorities.78 The concern for minimizing fragmen-
tation along religious lines reflects the demographic characteristics of
California. The courts' special sensitivity to the plight of religious mi-
norities-preventing the government from ostracizing them by endorsing
a majority faith-fulfllls an important stabilizing function in so diverse a
population. From the first 1849 Constitution, the bar against govern-
mental "preference" for sectarian beliefs established an official policy of
government neutrality to prevent divisiveness.79 Throughout Califor-
nia's history the need for religious tolerance has been an important theme
in case law. In contrast, an emerging theme in some federal cases is the
perceived need to allow public acknowledgement of our religious heri-
tage-by which judges mean the Judeo-Christian heritage-and the ben-
efits of accepting a public "civil religion."8 In California, courts have
recognized that residents do not share a common religious heritage; thus,
California's constitutional heritage shows tolerance for divergent
beliefs.81
Although the California Constitution undoubtedly will assume
greater significance in limiting governmental endorsement of religion as
establishment clause doctrine retreats, there is one significant limitation
on the power of California courts to enforce the State constitution. Be-
cause religious speech is, of course, protected speech, some measure of
federal constitutional protection for it will override State constitutional
provisions on church and state. Federal courts have already conferred
federal constitutional protection for worship or religious symbols in pub-
lic forums under the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution.82 The issue likely will be confined to a public
forum context.
78. See Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr.
819 (1987).
79. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
80. See, e.g., Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (cere-
monial invocation and benediction at public school commencement not precluded by First
Amendment); cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Nebraska Legislature's opening of
each session with a prayer by state-paid chaplain not precluded by First Amendment).
81. "[O]ur own state Constitution is-committed to the principle of separation of church
and state. The mutually reinforcing constitutional provisions have helped make this state one
in which persons of different religious beliefs might live together in mutual tolerance and re-
spect." Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 803, 587 P.2d 663, 669, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867,
873 (1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
82. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university must make facilities
available for religious clubs); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (citypark allowing secular symbols must allow reli-
gious symbols).
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D. Summary of Freedom of Religion
The significance of state constitutional doctrine on religious liberty
undoubtedly will be great in the coming years. The clear signals from
the United States Supreme Court indicate a retreat in establishment
clause doctrine in the name of religious accommodation. Strict separa-




Privacy encompasses a broad and diverse area. Constitutional pri-
vacy has two separate aspects: informational privacy and autonomy. In-
formational privacy includes control of personal information, limits on
data compilation, and access to personal information in the control of
third parties. Autonomy includes freedom to make intimate choices and
the right to control invasion of the body.
B. Sources
In contrast to the implicit penumbral right of privacy in, the United
States Constitution, California's article I, section 1 explicitly guarantees
privacy as a fundamental right.83 Enacted by voters in 1972, the privacy
initiative was, according to the ballot pamphlet argument supporting its
passage, enacted to safeguard both informational privacy and
automony.84 The ballot pamphlet addressed the accelerating encroach-
ment on individual privacy resulting from powerful data collection tech-
nology, the need for protection for families, homes, and thoughts; and
expansion of existing privacy decisions."
C. Informational Privacy
While very little federal constitutional protection exists for personal
information, 6 California has led the nation in creating a body of State
constitutional law that prevents "cradle-to-grave" profiles. Article I, sec-
tion 1 has been invoked in numerous cases involving employment
records,87 health records, 8 financial records, 9 and scholastic records. 90
It is also regularly invoked in litigation when discovery threatens to in-
83. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
84. 1972 VOTERS' HANDBOOK, Proposition 11.
85. Id.
86. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
87. Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 132 Cal. App. 3d 152, 182 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1982); City
and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435
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trude into intimate spheres such as sexual history.9" Reported cases reg-
ularly include informational privacy decisions under article I, section 1 in
advance sheet reports. These suggest that there are many more unpub-
lished decisions dealing with informational privacy claims.
The question for the future of the informational aspect of article I,
section 1 is its scope. We live in an informational age; can courts really
demand a compelling interest for every request for personal data by busi-
ness and government? At least one court of appeal decision suggested in
dictum that courts should apply a lower threshold for justifying informa-
tional requests unless other fundamental rights are implicated.92 This
approach seems to be incorrect since the ballot pamphlet argument is
explicit in requiring a compelling interest as the standard for justifying
invasion of informational privacy.9 3 Moreover, the Cutter approach
would make article I, section 1 superfluous if the compelling interest
standard were triggered only by a burden on another fundamental right
because the burden on a separate fundamental right alone would require
a compelling interest.
That society has developed such powerful communications technol-
ogy shows that the framers of article I, section 1 were visionaries; if the
privacy provision slows and limits compilation of data banks, it is per-
forming its function. Requests for judicial oversight on demands for in-
(1981); Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981);
Arcelona v. Municipal Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d 523, 169 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1980).
88. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 226 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1986); Wood v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 212 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1985); Jones
v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981); Gunn v. Employment
Dev. Dept., 94 Cal. App. 3d 658, 156 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979); Board of Medical Quality Assur-
ance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979).
89. Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1975); GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 748, 198 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1984); Allen v.
Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 447, 198 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1984); Moskowitz v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982); Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 1045, 177 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1981).
90. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
91. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292
(1987) (both protecting privacy of plaintiff's sexual history); Boler v. Superior Court, 201 Cal.
App. 3d 467, 247 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1987); Rider v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 278, 244
Cal. Rptr. 770 (1988); Binder v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 3d 893, 242 Cal. Rptr. 231
(1987); Morales v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979); Fults v.
Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1979).
92. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 844 n.7, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 550 n.7
(1986).
93. The ballot pamphlet argument states, "The right of privacy is an important American
heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Ninth Amendments. This right should be abridged only when there is a compelling public
need." 1972 VOTERS' HANDBOOK, Argument in favor of Proposition 11, at 27.
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formation are manageable if article I, section 1 is interpreted to protect
intimate or confidential personal data, not simply any records.
D. Autonomy
The United States Supreme Court has protected a cluster of choices
relating to family (child rearing, contraception, marriage) under the im-
plicit federal constitutional right to privacy.94 Any suggestion that the
Court might expand the federal privacy right to protect nonconforming
lifestyle choices was firmly dispelled by the Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick," upholding Georgia's sodomy law. The majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Hardwick illustrate two different approaches to adjudicat-
ing constitutional privacy claims. The dissenting approach more closely
mirrors the approach adopted under article I, section 1.
The majority decision in Hlardwick looked to the federal privacy
precedents to evaluate the kinds of choices protected by the Constitution
and, noting that they all related to the family, concluded that federal
precedents had "no connection" to homosexual activity.96 The majority
also considered historical and contemporary attitudes toward homosex-
ual activity to buttress its conclusion that the Constitution did not pro-
tect it.97
The Hardwick dissent focused not on "a right to engage in homosex-
ual activity" but rather the government's interest in criminalizing con-
sensual adult activity in the privacy of the home.98 The dissent asked
what constituted the basis for the state's punishing this intimate choice. 99
Because the dissent could discern no substantial interest, and concluded
that the criminal law simply reflected the fact that the choice upset the
moral views of the political majority, the dissent felt that it was
impermissible.1°°
The Hardwick majority expressly recognized the right of state
courts to take a more expansive approach under state constitutions.10 1
The majority also voiced an institutional concern about the role of the
Court in construing an implicit right: at what point is the Court impos-
94. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbral right to privacy
protects married couples' choices regarding contraception).
95. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
96. Id. at 190-91.
97. Id. at 192-94.
98. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 208-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 190.
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ing its own "choice of values"?1 2 The dissent, in contrast, expressed
more concern about limits on the political majority, and was not troubled
by its role in defining the limits of public life and the protection of a
private sphere in which all intimate choices would be protected unless
they threatened important public policies."°3
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution as interpreted by
State courts embodies the approach of the Hardwick dissenters. Califor-
nians have a public life and a private life, with a zone of protection for
intimate choices that do not jeopardize paramount governmental inter-
ests. Thus, the California Constitution's privacy clause combats
majoritarian efforts to impose societal conformity.
1. Associational Privacy: The Alternate Family
A striking example of the different state and federal approaches to
privacy is in the area of family zoning. One visible consequence of socie-
tal change in America is the choice of many people to live in households
that do not conform to the model of the traditional family. Some com-
munities have used their zoning authority to restrict the living arrange-
ments of their residents."4 These laws have been challenged on state and
federal privacy grounds as infringing the right of association with roots
in the privacy concept.105
The United States Supreme Court rejected the claims that the fed-
eral right of privacy protects the choice to live with persons unconnected
by marriage, biology, or legal ties in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.10 6
The ordinance challenged in Belle Terre, designed in part to zone out
fraternity houses and other student collective houses from the nearby
university at Stony Brook, limited single family dwellings to "families"
related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and servants.' 07 Having refused
to recognize any constitutional right in the living arrangements of per-
102. Ia1 at 191.
103. Id. at 203-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Restrictive zoning laws have been enacted in Stony Brook, New York; East Cleveland,
Ohio; Santa Barbara, California; Borough of Glassboro, New Jersey; White Plains, New York;
North Hempstead, New York; Coral Springs, Florida; Brewer, Maine; and Washington Town-
ship, Ohio. For cases discussing the validity of the ordinances, see infra notes 106-118 and
accompanying text.
105. See also State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979); Molino v. Mayor of Glass-
boro, 116 N.J. Super. 193, 281 A.2d 401 (1971); Group Home of Port Washington v. Board of
Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (all striking
down restrictive laws under state constitutional provisions). Contra Penobscot Area Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981); Carroll v. Washington Township Zon-
ing Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 408 N.E.2d 191 (1980).
106. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
107. Id. at 2-3.
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sons unconnected by the statutorily defined ties, the Court upheld the
zoning law under a deferential standard of reasonableness."0 8 The law
permissibly promoted "family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion, and clean air."10 9
The Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland u °I made clear three
years later that a community could not delve into the biological family
and zone out extended families. The East Cleveland ordinance was
struck down because it restricted "family" to the nuclear family and
would have had the effect of separating a grandchild, with parents unable
to care for him, from his grandmother. 1' The Court emphasized the
aspect of Belle Terre that upheld the promotion of family values and
concluded that the extended family, with its venerable roots in American
history, could not be divided by zoning boards.11 2 The decision relied on
substantive due process, a concept philosophically aligned with privacy
in that it places limits on the power of government to interfere with inti-
mate choices.
California's article I, section 1 is not limited to the Belle
Terre/Moore biological family framework, but also protects unconven-
tional living arrangements. The California Supreme Court ruled that ar-
ticle I, section 1 encompassed the right to live in an alternate family. 3
A zoning ordinance that defined family members who may reside to-
gether was thus ruled invalid when challenged by a group of unrelated
adults with emotional ties to one another." 4 The court stated, "In gen-
eral, zoning ordinances are much less suspect when they focus on the use
than when they command inquiry into who are the users."'15
The state and federal approaches differ. Under the California Con-
stitution, the government is limited to thepublic sphere-the actual land
use problems connected to numbers-not the private issue of relation-
ships among the occupants. In contrast, the federal right protects only
choices connected to the family.
For example, the California Supreme Court ruled that the article I,
section 1 protection of choices relating to living companions applies even
when the government subsidizes the shelter, thus limiting its authority to
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 9.
110. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
111. Id. at 498-99.
112. Id. at 504-05.
113. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 134, 610 P.2d 436, 442, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 539, 545 (1980).
114. Id. at 127, 134, 610 P.2d at 437-38, 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41, 545.
115. Id. at 133, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544 (emphasis deleted).
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standardize welfare recipients' living arrangements without a compelling
justification." 6 The diversity and pervasiveness of land use controls
leads to numerous questions about the scope of the state privacy right
and the degree to which it renders certain restrictions unconstitutional.
The California Supreme Court upheld a statutory provision allowing pri-
vate mobile-home parks the right to exclude children.117 Exercise of this
statutory right injures some biological families. The court distinguished
between a law codifying common-law property rights and a law under
which the government itself limits living arrangements in a whole com-
munity or area. 118
2. Sexuality
Although California courts have never been called upon to decide
the validity of laws restricting consensual adult noncommercial sexual
conduct, there is little doubt that the sodomy statute upheld in Hardwick
would violate article I, section 1. The courts' protection of information
about sexual partners1 19 undoubtedly extends to limiting the power of
the state to criminalize private consensual adult conduct.
3. Reproductive Rights
California has a pioneering history in the area of reproductive free-
dom. Four years before the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
federal right to privacy encompassed a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy by abortion,12 ° the California Supreme Court recognized that
the State constitution protected the fundamental rights to life and choice
implicated in the abortion decision.121 The Court reaffirmed this in 1972,
striking down restrictive eligibility criteria in California's Therapeutic
Abortion Act. 122
After passage of the privacy initiative in 1972, the California
Supreme Court ruled that article I, section 1 forbade the government's
116. Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1985)
(enjoining Sacramento program that compelled welfare recipients to accept "in-kind" care in
regimented shelter).
117. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 3d 370, 769 P.2d 932, 256 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1989).
118. Id. at 388-89, 769 P.2d at 943-44, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62.
119. Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987);
Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1979).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cerL denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970).
122. People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
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elimination of abortion from the Medi-Cal system.'23 The Court held
that the privacy clause imposed a duty of neutrality on the government,
which was violated by the government's subsidy of childbirth and refusal
to fund abortions."' The decision invoked the strong California doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions and also squarely held that the state pri-
vacy provision protects the intimate and fundamental decision whether
to bear a child.125 The California Supreme Court grounded its decision
entirely on the State constitution; the United States Supreme Court had
ruled nine months earlier that the implicit federal provision did not bar
the government from eliminating abortion from a publicly financed pro-
gram of medical assistance.126
California's independent constitutional protection for abortion un-
doubtedly will be an important area of State privacy litigation in the
1990s. The abortion funding controversy continues because the Califor-
nia Legislature has never followed Myers. The annual budget acts have
contained restrictions on abortion every year since 1979,127 and succes-
sive court challenges have been brought to enforce the duty recognized in
Myers. California appellate courts have followed the decision.' 28 The
California Supreme Court has denied successive petitions in which the
government has asked the court to reverse Myers and follow the analysis
of the federal Harris v. McRae decision.
The California Legislature also enacted restrictions on minors' ac-
cess to abortion in 1987, requiring teenagers to obtain parental consent
or a court order prior to obtaining an abortion.'2 9 The San Francisco
Superior Court has enjoined that law under article I, section 1. In the
appeal from the injunction, the state and amici curiae supporting its posi-
tion argued that the State constitution should not be interpreted differ-
ently from the United States Constitution in the context of third-party
consent for minors' abortions. The court of appeal rejected that claim in
an opinion that forcefully reaffirms the independence and expansive
123. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779,
172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
124. Id. at 284-85, 625 P.2d at 798-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
125. Id. at 262-63, 625 P.2d at 784-85, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72; see also Conservatorship
of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 161, 163, 707 P.2d 760, 771, 773, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398, 400
(1985).
126. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
127. See, eg., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Cory, 132 Cal. App. 3d 852,
854, 183 Cal. Rptr. 475, 476 (1982) (restrictions in the 1981 Budget Act).
128. Id. at 854, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77; Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Rank, 151 Cal. App. 3d 83, 198 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1984).
129. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 34.5 (West 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West
1987).
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scope of California's right to privacy in affirming the preliminary
injunction. 130
Enormous interest in the future of abortion has been sparked by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,"' in which both the State of Missouri and the Solicitor
General asked the Court to reconsider Roe v. Wade. 3 ' Although the
Court declined to reverse Roe, the Webster opinion revealed that Roe no
longer commands a majority of the Supreme Court. Five Justices have
announced their views that Roe should be modified or overturned.133 Be-
cause the Court will hear three cases challenging state laws restricting
abortion in the next Term,13 1 substantial change in the analytic structure
of the federal constitutional right to abortion may occur before the end of
the decade.
Because the Court may relax or eliminate the Roe standards, Cali-
fornia's state constitutional protection for reproductive privacy has as-
sumed great importance as the abortion battle shifts back to the states.
Article I, section 1 clearly prohibits criminal abortion legislation in Cali-
fornia, assuming, of course, that the United States Supreme Court does
not confer federal constitutional protection on the fetus. The state pri-
vacy clause undoubtedly will be the subject of litigation involving not
only the right to abortion but other reproductive rights issues that have
emerged with the combination of new medical technology and an active
political movement to promote fetal interests. Future cases may deal
with intervention during pregnancy in the interest of protecting fetuses.
These cases may consider the following issues: Caesarean births over the
130. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1989).
131. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
132. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133. Justices White and Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, which
criticized and called for elimination of Roe's trimester framework under which the state's in-
terest in fetal survival becomes compelling only at the point of fetal viability. Webster, 109 S.
Ct. at 3055-57. Justice Scalia explicitly urged the Court to overrule Roe. Id. at 3064-67. Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion that repeated her view that abortion regulations
should be subject to strict scrutiny only when they "unduly burden" the right to seek an
abortion. Id. at 3063. She "continue[d] to consider problematic" Roe's trimester framework.
Id.; see also Akron v. Akron Center for, Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thorburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240
(1989) (Minnesota statute requiring notification to both parents or court authorization for
minor's abortion); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir.
1988), juris. noted sub. norn Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 3239
(1989) (challenge to Ohio law requiring parental notification or court order for minor's abor-
tion); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988),juris. postponed, 109 S. Ct. 3239
(challenge to Illinois law regulating licensing of first-trimester abortion clinics).
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woman's objection, coerced fetal surgery, confinement of substance-abus-
ing pregnant women, and restrictions on work in potentially hazardous
environments.
The possibility of a country without Roe's national constitutional
protection for the abortion choice illustrates some aspects of state consti-
tutional adjudication in the real world of politics. The specter of a nation
with divergent rights to abortion, dependent on different state constitu-
tional texts and interpretations, is disturbing to people on both sides of
the abortion debate. In many contexts, unique state constitutional rights
are considered a beneficial incident of federalism. Advocates of the right-
to-choose abortion believe, however, that such a profound and intimate
right should not depend on an accident of geography, while advocates of
fetal life want uniform national protection for fetal existence.
The fervor of the political battle surrounding abortion raises the
possibility of efforts to amend the State constitution to eliminate the pri-
vacy clause's protection for abortion. Other states already have exper-
ienced divisive battles around, state initiative measures involving
abortion. 135 One aspect of state constitutional adjudication that is differ-
ent from federal constitutional interpretation is the ease with which the
voters may reject it by initiative. The voters' right to amend the State
constitution by a simple majority keeps the State charter responsive to
the contemporary needs of California society, although allowing electoral
changes to the State constitution undermines the special role of a consti-
tution in protecting the minority by placing fundamental values beyond
the reach of the majority. Whether one believes the initiative process to
be a healthy remedy in a democracy or politically abused process, a fu-
ture in which abortion rights are the province of the state judiciary, with
limited federal constitutional protection, invites efforts to bring the issue
to the electorate.
135. Three electoral battles on abortion occurred in 1988. Arkansas voters passed a consti-
tutional amendment banning funding and declaring protection for life as state policy, Colorado
voters rejected an attempt to repeal a 1984 initiative barring abortion funding, and Michigan
voters rejected a referendum to restore funding for abortions. In 1986 there were five abortion
related electoral battles. Oregon voters rejected an initiative to prohibit abortion funding.
Massachusetts voters rejected a constitutional amendment to overturn independent state con-
stitutional protection for the right to choose abortion. Rhode Island and Connecticut voters
rejected a call for a constitutional .convention on abortion. Arkansas voters rejected similar
measures. In California, three separate initiatives to amend the California Constitution to
overturn Myers have never qualified for the ballot.
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E. Bodily Integrity
L Rights of the Critically Ill
In the area of bodily integrity, California courts have been called
upon in the 1980s to determine whether article I, section 1 protects an
individual's refusal to accept life-sustaining treatment. Historically, the
right to refuse medication was raised in a first amendment context when
members of some religious groups had religiously based objections to cer-
tain forms of medical care. 36 With the development of sophisticated
life-sustaining treatments, the question has focused more on privacy as
patients and families of patients wish to refuse certain heroic treatments
for personal, not religious, reasons. The United States Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the privacy issue under the federal law, but has
accepted a case that raises these issues.' 37
Without dissent, California courts have decided, in the contexts
presented, that Californians have a fundamental right to refuse treat-
ment, even if the consequence of that decision is death.138 The courts
have invoked article I, section 1, as Well as the common-law informed
consent concept, to approve the cessation of treatment in the following
contexts.
First, family members have the right to discontinue food and water
for a patient in a persistently vegetative'state.139 The courts concluded
that the right of choice under article I, section 1 survived a patient's
incompetence.
Second, a healthy although seriously disabled woman had the right
to disconnect her forced feeding tube although death would probably en-
sue."4° The court made it clear that the right to refuse treatment under
article I, section 1 was "absolute" in the sense that it was not subject to
medical override by disapproving physicians. 4'
Finally, a competent older man whose illness was serious but not
terminal had a right to disconnect a ventilator although this would cause
136. See, e.g., Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 33 Cal. App.
3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973).
137. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
138. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
139. Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983).
140. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
141. "If there is ever a time when we ought to be able to get the 'government off our backs'
it is when we face death-either by choice or otherwise." Id. at 1148, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 308
(Compton, J., concurring).
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respiratory failure and death.142 The court ruled that the patient's right
overrode the religious beliefs of the staff of the private, religiously affili-
ated hospital in which he was a patient.
The right to refuse medical care raises profound questions that a
society with increasingly sophisticated medical technology will confront
in many different forms. The California cases have not answered all of
the questions that will arise, despite their strong holdings about the scope
of the State privacy right. In all of the decided cases, although the lan-
guage of the opinions spoke strongly about self-determination, the courts
plainly felt that the patients (or their surrogates) were making reasonable
decisions in view of the quality of life that the disabled or incompetent
patient faced. What would the courts decide about a competent patient
whose decision seemed far less rational to a court? For example, what
about a teenage accident victim who wanted to refuse life-sustaining
treatment because he did not desire to have an adult life with disabilities?
A paradox exists because the court's decisions readily limit medical care
for an incompetent patient whose diminished quality of life makes judges
comfortable with the decision, despite the incompetent's inability to exer-
cise the choice that represents the essence of the right protected.
The courts also must deal with issues of competency to make pri-
vacy choices. For example, psychotropic drugs that can provide thera-
peutic benefits also carry serious side effects. Many voluntary patients
are competent to make treatment decisions, but many psychiatrists are
opposed to allowing patients the right to refuse medication, the very
treatment that allows many patients to live outside institutional settings.
The courts will be called upon to decide how to enforce the patients'
privacy interest when there is a strong conflict between doctor and pa-
tient in the context of powerful medication and psychological
difficulties. 43
2. Access to Drugs or Other Treatment and Drug Testing
Although article I, section 1 clearly protects an individual's access
to recognized medical treatments,' 44 it also clearly does not encompass
142. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
143. A California court of appeal has ruled that patients have a statutory right to refuse
psychotropic medication; the court did not address the constitutional privacy claim. Riese v.
St. Mary's Hosp. and Medical Center, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1987).
144. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 162-63, 707 P.2d 760, 773-74, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 399-400 (1985) (sterilization); Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (1976) (electroconvulsive therapy).
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the right to obtain either unproven therapeutic drugs145 or illegal "recre-
ational" drugs. 146
Although article I, section 1 fails to confer a right of access to illegal
drugs, it does provides protection against drug testing. In a context
analogous to drug testing, the California Supreme Court recognized that
an employer's legitimate interest in controlling theft does not mean that
forcible administration of lie-detector tests is permitted in view of the
substantial privacy invasion caused by such devices. 47
Urinalysis drug testing was once used only in prisons and the armed
forces. Technological advances have made drug testing less expensive
and thus far more available to employers. Coupled with a public cam-
paign to eradicate drug abuse, urine testing is now used by more than
fifty percent of Fortune 500 companies. 14  In addition to random testing
in employment, drug testing programs have been launched against stu-
dent athletes and against pregnant women and their infants in hospitals.
This surge in drug testing has led to a surge of drug testing litiga-
tion. The United States Supreme Court has recognized only limited pro-
tection under the Federal Fourth Amendment for individuals who do not
consent to drug testing. 149 Challenges to drug testing are only now reach-
ing California appellate courts although the California Supreme Court
has observed in dictum that urine testing, while not as physically invasive
as blood testing, implicates "privacy and dignitary interests."' 50 Supe-
rior courts have enjoined drug testing programs under article I, section 1
for testing of oil refinery workers,' bus drivers,'52 chemical plant work-
145. People v. Privatera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 949 (1979) (laetrile).
146. People v. Davis, 92 Cal. App. 3d 250, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1979) (cocaine); cf. Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 502 (Alaska 1975) (privacy clause of Alaska Constitution guarantees right
to ingest marijuana in privacy of home).
147. Long Beach City Employee Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 944, 719
P.2d 660, 663-64, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90, 93 (1986).
148. Strauss, Tests Detect Users of Poppy Seeds, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 2, 1989, at 10 (citing
United States Chamber of Commerce).
149. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 57 U.S.L.W. 4338 (March 21,
1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 57 U.S.L.W. 4324 (March 21, 1989).
150. People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 739 n.7, 750 P.2d 741, 754 n.7, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867,
880 n.7, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 329 (1988).
15 1. Price v. Pacific Refining Co., No. A039203 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Mar. 11,
1987) (order granting preliminary injunction), modified, (July 10, 1987), petition for writ of
mandate denied, Pacific Refining Co. v. Superior Court, No. A039203 (Cal. Ct. App. July 21,
1987).
152. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist.,
No. C628562 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1987) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
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ers, ' 3  hospital employees,1 54  city workers, '55  and garlic ranch
workers.' 5
6
The state constitutional privacy issues raised by drug testing are in-
teresting because they involve both aspects of the right to privacy: infor-
mational privacy and bodily integrity. Drug testing implicates
informational privacy protection because the tests reveal a broad chemi-
cal proffle, beyond illicit drugs, including diet and other medications.
The individual must also reveal other medications ingested so that test
results will not be skewed. Urinalysis allows for broad chemical surveil-
lance because of the number of potentially intimate matters revealed. 157
Drug testing raises questions about improper disclosure of intimate medi-
cal and personal information and about checks on the accuracy of the
testing-one of the central abuses addressed by the voters in enacting the
article I, section 1 explicit right to privacy. Drug testing invades protec-
tion for the anatomy because it often requires an individual to undress
and expose private parts of the body in front of strangers for mandatory
and monitored collection of urine.
Drug testing clearly implicates article I, section 1 privacy. Many
entities conducting drug tests have a significant interest in preventing
substance abuse on the job. The issues posed for the courts center pri-
marily on whether drug testing is necessary to achieve a drug-free envi-
ronment. The related issues question whether testing represents
sufficiently precise methodology (since it cannot measure current impair-
ment and is subject to mechanical and human error) and whether other
less restrictive methods of detecting abuse can be devised. These ques-
tions involve the courts in highly technological inquiries. Although eval-
uating technology seems somewhat remote from traditional
constitutional adjudication, it was foreshadowed by the passage of article
I, section 1, motivated in part by California voters' concern about com-
puter technology.
153. Mora v. 3M Co., No. 94233 (Ventura County Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1987) (ruling granting
preliminary injunction).
154. Farley v. Estelle Doheney Eye Hosp. No. C629354 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
June 23, 1987) (ruling granting preliminary injunction).
155. Loder v. City of Glendale, No. C616659 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Sept. 8,
1987) (ruling granting preliminary injunction), appeal pending.
156. Perry v. A&D Christopher Ranch, No. 661337 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. July
20, 1988) (order granting temporary restraining order); see also Hill v. NCAA, No. 619209
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1989) (enjoining drug testing of college atheletes).
157. For example, urine tests can reveal pregnancy. The District of Columbia Police De-
partment secretly tested its female job applicants for pregnancy until this practice was revealed
by the press. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416; 434 n.17 (D.D.C.
1988).
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3. AIDS Testing
Mandatory testing of certain populations for the HIV virus, which
causes AIDS, raises many of the same issues. California has recently
adopted testing programs for inmates and defendants accused of certain
offenses. 158 California voters and legislators have declined to enact nu-
merous other compulsory testing and reporting programs; efforts to enact
such laws continue. Challenges to these programs may include claims
that mandatory reporting of results to officials violates informational pri-
vacy, which protects sensitive medical information; forced testing vio-
lates the right to bodily integrity; and, because mandatory testing
coupled with disclosure of results will discourage individuals from seek-
ing treatment and confidential testing, the testing programs interfere with
the right to seek recognized medical treatment. These challenges, like
drug testing cases, will combine both informational and substantive pri-
vacy and force the courts to delve into complicated technological and
medical questions. The interest in preventing the spread of so serious an
infection is undoubtedly compelling; the focus of court challenges will be
on whether testing and reporting laws in fact promote that goal and
whether less restrictive alternatives can accomplish the stated objective.
F. Summary of Privacy
While the federal right to privacy seems destined to be confined to a
limited number of choices, California's right to privacy has kept pace
with developments that have threatened individual privacy, in the areas
of both informational privacy and autonomy. Privacy is an area of con-
stitutional law in which it is easy to see how much would be lost if
Californians did not have a State constitutional right and their only con-
stitutional protection were derived from the implicit federal right of pri-
vacy. Article I, section 1 has limited the compilation of data banks and
intrusive interrogation during litigation. It has also protected unconven-
tional choices in a pluralistic society.
Returning to the debate among the Justices in Hardwick about the
institutional competence of the judiciary to define the scope of privacy, it
seems clear that California courts, while expanding the contours of pri-
vacy protection beyond a nucleus of family-related choices, have created
a principled body of law in defining article I, section 1. There are limits
to the State constitution's protection for unconventional choices. It does
not, for example, render the State powerless to criminalize drug use or
158. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.95-.99 (Deering Supp. 1989) (Propo-
sition 96, approved November 8, 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1524.1, 7500-7553 (Deering
Supp. 1989).
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commercial sex. Within a broad zone, however, the State right of pri-
vacy guarantees far more liberty in intimate spheres than the federal
right.
Article I, section 1 also has fulfilled its function of protecting pri-
vacy in a technological age. Although computers constitute the specific
threat perceived in the 1972 privacy initiative, the courts have invoked
article I, section 1 to delineate the limits of other technology that in-
trudes into personal privacy: life-sustaining treatment, lie detectors, drug
testing, and AIDS testing. Future developments in science-technology
that Californians in 1989 cannot even imagine-will undoubtedly pose
challenges. The State right to privacy guarantees at least serious debate
over the need for these developments, and that they will not be casually
implemented without judicial oversight to ensure that the privacy sacri-
ficed by scientific advances is justified by only the most significant public
concerns.
Conclusion
The State constitutional law movement has been led by judges and
by law faculty. In California, it has resulted in an outstanding body of
state constitutional law protecting individual rights. It is time to spread
this revolution beyond the courts and law schools: to the press, to the
public, and to decision makers. Many legislators and executive officials
do not understand their duty to obey both federal and state constitutions.
It is important to teach state constitutional principles not only in law
schools, but also in civics classes.
The day should come when Californians speak of "article I, section
2 rights" instead of "first amendment rights," recognizing what is be-
coming reality: that the State constitution is the primary protection for
their individual freedom.

